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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
JAMES HARRISON* 
ABSTRACT 
International investment law has assumed an increasing prominence 
largely due to the proliferation of investment treaties and the number of 
arbitral awards made thereunder.  Yet, there are many core questions 
that remain to be authoritatively answered.  This Article considers the 
nature of the divergences in investment treaty jurisprudence and the role 
that the International Law Commission (ILC) could potentially play in 
contributing to the coherent development of international investment 
law.  The Article argues that some areas of international investment law 
are more appropriate for attention by the ILC than others.  It draws a 
distinction between those aspects of international investment that only 
have a basis in treaty law and those aspects of international investment 
law that are underpinned by common standards stemming from 
customary international law or general principles of law. 
The Article argues that international investment scholars cannot 
necessarily expect the convergence of jurisprudence in the context of 
treaty provisions that have been specifically negotiated by the parties, as 
these provisions must be interpreted on a case-by-case basis.  This 
means that topics like the most-favored-nation (MFN) clause are less 
suitable for codification, as the meaning of these provisions will often 
depend on the particular context of the treaty and the precise intentions 
of the parties.  In contrast, there is a stronger case for the codification of 
international investment law where common standards exist.  The 
Article therefore considers the formation and development of customary 
international law in relation to investment protection.  It argues that 
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while investment treaty tribunals have struggled with the identification 
of customary international law in this area, the ILC could play a central 
role in clarifying the state of the relevant rules and principles, in 
furtherance of its core mandate of promoting the progressive 
development and codification of international law. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
International investment law is a fast-moving and dynamic area of 
law.  The subject has assumed an increasing prominence over the past 
twenty years, largely due to the proliferation of investment treaties and 
the number of arbitral awards decided on the basis of these instruments.  
At the end of 2011, 450 known cases had been brought under bilateral 
investment treaties or similar agreements.1  At the same time, there are a 
number of fundamental questions that remain to be answered.  Although 
the majority of investment treaties follow a very similar logic and 
structure,2 arbitral tribunals have often adopted diverging interpretations 
of treaty provisions.3  In turn, this has led to doctrinal confusion and 
questions about the coherence of international investment law.4  Some 
authors have even talked about a “legitimacy crisis” in international 
investment law.5 
Recently, the International Law Commission (ILC) has joined the 
debate concerning how to address this challenge.6  The central argument 
of this Article is that the ILC can make a valuable contribution to the 
development and consolidation of international investment law.  At the 
same time, it suggests that the ILC should choose its focus of study 
carefully.  It also suggests that the current focus of the ILC on the most-
favored-nation (MFN) treatment7 is not likely to lead to satisfactory 
 
 1. Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA ISSUES NOTE NO. 1 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)), Apr. 2012, at 5, available 
at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2012d10_en.pdf. 
 2. See STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 65 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009); Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global 
Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 431 (2010). 
 3. See infra Part III. 
 4. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing 
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1523 
(2005). 
 5. See id.; Ari Afilalo, Towards a Common Law of International Investment: How NAFTA 
Chapter 11 Panels Should Solve Their Legitimacy Crisis, 17 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 52 
(2004).  But see Devashish Krishan, Thinking About BITs and BIT Arbitration: The Legitimacy 
Crisis that Never Was, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: IN MEMORIAM 
THOMAS WAELDE 107, 110 (T. Weiler & F. Baetens eds., 2011). 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
 7. Most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment refers to the guarantee that a foreign investor 
from one country will not be treated less favorably than foreign investors from other countries.  
2013] The International Law Commission 103 
results as the interpretation of these clauses largely depends upon the 
particular wording of individual treaties.  In such cases, there is little 
reason to expect a coherent jurisprudence given the autonomous nature 
of the treaty standards, and therefore these issues should be left to 
tribunals to develop based upon existing rules of treaty interpretation.  
Rather, this Article argues that the ILC should concentrate on its core 
mandate of codifying customary international law.8  The Article argues 
that customary international law relating to the protection of investors is 
ripe for codification.  Moreover, the ILC is an ideal institution to 
undertake this task, due to its composition and its position at the heart of 
the United Nations (UN) system. 
II.  THE FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 
The ILC was established in 19479 to assist the UN General Assembly 
in its task of “encouraging the progressive development of international 
law and its codification.”10  The Commission is a body of thirty-four 
independent experts11 elected by the UN General Assembly.12  
Candidates must have a “recognized competence in international law.”13  
Moreover, the composition of the Commission as a whole should reflect 
“the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the 
world.”14  These characteristics of the Commission cannot be 
overemphasized as they add significantly to the legitimacy of its work 
in producing authoritative and influential texts on the existing state of 
international law.15 
It must also be stressed that the ILC does not work alone in the 
codification process.  The ILC Statute explicitly requires consultation 
between the Commission and individual governments on the one 
 
Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switz.), 2012 at 137. 
 8. Statute of the International Law Commission (ILC), G.A. Res. 174 (II), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/36/39 (Nov. 18, 1981), at art. 1, para. 1 [hereinafter ILC Statute]. 
 9. The ILC Statute was adopted in November 1947, the first elections for the Commission 
took place in November 1948 and the Commission met for the first time in 1949. See 
Introduction, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/ilcintro.htm (last 
visited June 1, 2013).  
 10. U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1. 
 11. IAN SINCLAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 14 (Grotius Publ’ns 1987). 
 12. ILC Statute, supra note 8, art. 3. 
 13. Id. art. 2. 
 14. Id. art. 8.  In fact, the composition is subject to a “gentleman’s agreement” that the seats 
will be divided amongst the five geographical regions of the UN and each permanent member of 
the Security Council will have their own representative.  See SINCLAIR, supra note 11, at 15–16. 
 15. For example, Sinclair suggests that “the Commission, if it is to produce drafts likely to 
be generally acceptable to States, should be so composed as to reflect the varying tendencies and 
attitudes of geographical groupings within the United Nations system.”  Id. at 17. 
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hand,16 and with the UN General Assembly on the other hand.17  In 
practice, the ILC maintains a regular dialogue with the Sixth Committee 
of the UN General Assembly,18 as well as with other intergovernmental 
bodies with an interest in codification of international law.19  These are 
important provisions, as the imprimatur of governments is often key to 
successful codification.20 
According to its Statute, “the [ILC] shall have for its object the 
promotion of the progressive development of international law and its 
codification.”21  Thus, the Commission has two related but arguably 
distinct tasks.  Codification is understood as “the more precise 
formulation and systematization of rules of international law in fields 
where there already has been extensive State practice, precedent and 
doctrine.”22  Progressive development, on the other hand, refers to “the 
preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been 
regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has not yet 
been sufficiently developed in the practice of States.”23  In practice, the 
ILC has struggled to clearly distinguish between these two activities.24  
Moreover, even the earliest attempts of international codification by the 
League of Nations recognized that the process of codification “should 
not confine itself to the mere registration of the existing rules, but 
should aim at adapting them as far as possible to the contemporary 
conditions of international life.”25 
 
 16. ILC Statute article 19, paragraph 2 provides, “The Commission shall, through the 
Secretary-General, address to Governments a detailed request to furnish the texts of laws, 
decrees, judicial decisions, treaties, diplomatic correspondence and other documents relevant to 
the topic being studied and which the Commission deems necessary.”  See also ILC Statute, 
supra note 8, art. 21, para. 2 (requiring the Commission to submit a final draft of any proposed 
codification to governments for comment before formally submitting them with recommendations 
to the General Assembly). 
 17. ILC Statute, supra note 8, art. 20. 
 18. The Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly is responsible for Legal Affairs, and 
it is this body that receives the annual reports of the ILC.  See R. P. U.N. G.A. 98(f). 
 19. Introduction, supra note 9.  
 20. See ALAN E. BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
178 (2007) (“Of greatest importance, however, is the Commission’s relationship with the General 
Assembly, because its work can only be successful if it is politically acceptable to member 
states.”); see also SINCLAIR, supra note 11, at 125 (“A codification convention that does not 
enjoy the support or approval of a significant group of States whose assent is necessary to the 
effective implementation of the convention is hardly likely to be regarded as being expressive of 
existing international law or as generating new law.”). 
 21. ILC Statute, supra note 8, art. 1, para. 1. 
 22. Id. art. 15. 
 23. Id. 
 24. SINCLAIR, supra note 11, at 46. 
 25. Resolutions and Recommendations Adopted by the Assembly During Its Eighth 
Ordinary Session, League of Nations, § III(I) (Sept. 27, 1927). 
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Despite these procedural ambiguities, the ILC has to date played an 
important role in developing various aspects of international law.  The 
ILC is perhaps best known for its preparation of draft articles on the law 
of treaties 26 and the law of state responsibility.27  However, the ILC has 
also contributed to the development of several substantive areas of 
international law, such as the international law of the sea, international 
environmental law, and international criminal law.28  Indeed, the work 
of the Commission has been highly influential in the development of 
international law. 
Sometimes, the recommendations of the ILC lead to the negotiation 
and conclusion of a treaty, as in the case of the law of treaties.29  In 
these cases, the results are binding upon those states that choose to 
consent to be bound by the instrument.  Yet, often, the work of the ILC 
can also have a declaratory effect on international law, even if a state 
does not formally accept it.  Thus, many provisions of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) are considered 
to be declaratory of customary international law and therefore binding 
on all states, whether or not they have become a party to the treaty.30  
Moreover, even when they are not adopted in treaty form, texts prepared 
by the Commission have been taken into account by courts and tribunals 
as a definitive statement of customary international law.31 
 
 26. The Commission produced a set of draft articles on the law of treaties in 1966.  See 
generally Documents of the Second Part of the Seventeenth Session and of the Eighteenth Session 
Including the Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/183/Add.1-4.   
 27. The Commission adopted a set of draft articles on the law of state responsibility in 2001.  
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 31, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2).  The UN General Assembly took note of the draft 
articles and commended them to the attention of governments in 2001.  See Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 
2001); Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 59/35, ¶ 1, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/59/35 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
 28. For a general overview of the work of the ILC, see THE WORK OF THE INT’L L. 
COMM’N, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/ILC/8, U.N. Sales No. E.12.V.2 (8th ed. 2012).  See also BOYLE & 
CHINKIN, supra note 20, at 183–200. 
 29.  Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, 177, 177–87, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/183/Add.1-4.  These draft articles formed the basis of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties adopted in 1969.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 30. See, e.g., Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 38, ¶ 46 (Sept. 25) 
(“The Court has no need to dwell upon the question of the applicability in the present case of the 
Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties.  It needs only to be mindful of the fact that it 
has several times had occasion to hold that some of the rules laid down in that Convention might 
be considered as a codification of existing customary law.”). 
 31. For example, in CMS Gas v. Argentine Republic, the arbitral tribunal accepted that 
Article 25 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility “adequately reflects the state of customary 
international law on the question of necessity.”  CMS Gas Transmission Co. (U.S.) v. Argentine 
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Nor is it only through formal codification that the work of the ILC 
can be influential.  In practice, the Commission has also contributed to 
the so-called crystallization of customary international law.  In the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the court explained the 
crystallization of international law relating to the continental shelf as 
“the process of the definition and consolidation of the emerging 
customary law [that] took place through the work of the [ILC], the 
reaction of governments to that work and the proceedings of the Geneva 
Conference . . . .”32  This potential for interaction offers enormous 
opportunities for the development of customary international law 
through the work of the ILC.  At the same time, it has been observed 
that the Commission remains a rather conservative body, dealing with 
fairly traditional questions of international law and leaving the response 
to new and complex regulatory challenges to other international 
institutions.33 
This background sets the stage for some important questions about 
the role of the ILC in promoting the progressive development and 
codification of international investment law.  Is this an area of 
international law that is ripe for codification and/or progressive 
development?  Can all aspects of international investment law be 
subject to the same processes of codification and progressive 
development? 
III.  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE CODIFICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
International law has addressed the protection of foreign investors for 
over a century.  There are many examples of international arbitral 
awards in the early twentieth century that were concerned with the 
protection of foreigners from the arbitrary treatment of host 
governments.34  Indeed, in 1924, a Committee of Experts constituted by 
the League of Nations to investigate which topics or fields of law were 
“sufficiently ripe” for codification included the law relating to the 
protection of aliens in their recommendations.35  Yet, the Hague 
 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 315 (May 12, 2005). 
 32. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger./Den./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 61 
(Feb. 20).  See also Counter-Memorial of the Netherlands, North Sea Continental Shelf 
(Ger./Neth.), 1968 I.C.J. Pleadings 307, ¶ 66 (Feb. 20). 
 33. See, e.g., Alan E. Boyle, Codification of International Environmental Law and the 
International Law Commission: Injurious Consequences Revisited, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 61, 62 (A. E. Boyle & D. Freestone eds., 1999). 
 34. One of the most commonly cited cases from this period is the so-called Neer claim.  
Neer Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 60, 60–66 (Gen. Cl. Comm’n 1926). 
 35. The Resolution was adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 
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Codification Conference of 1930 was unable to agree on rules reflecting 
the current state of international law in this area36 and there were no 
clear outcomes of this initiative. 
Almost two decades later, when the ILC was established, the question 
of which topics of international law were ripe for codification was once 
again on the table.  Charged with preparing a report on the codification 
of international law, Hersch Lauterpacht concluded that the treatment of 
aliens was a topic that deserved the attention of the newly created UN 
body.37  Lauterpacht argued the following: 
The reasons which have been adduced in the previous section as 
militating in favour of a renewed effort at codifying the law of 
nationality and of conflicts of nationality—the growing movement 
across frontiers in an age in which barriers of distances have 
dwindled and the enhanced status of the individual as the subject of 
fundamental rights and freedoms—apply even more cogently to the 
question of the treatment and the legal position of aliens.38 
He also noted the “substantial body of State practice which, however, is 
only imperfectly related to principle.”39  Thus, Lauterpacht saw an 
opportunity to clarify the rules and principles that applied to the 
protection of aliens, including foreign investors. 
Following this recommendation, the ILC gave early priority to the 
law of state responsibility, including responsibility for the mistreatment 
of aliens.40  Yet, the ILC ran into similar problems that had emerged 
during the previous attempt at codification by the League of Nations.  
Some members of the Commission greeted the draft articles prepared by 
Francisco V. García-Amador, as Special Rapporteur on the law of state 
responsibility, with deep skepticism.  As noted by James Crawford and 
Thomas Grant, “the decade of decolonization could hardly have been a 
worse time to attempt a statement of what many governments (Latin 
 
27, 1927, where it decided to refer inter alia the topic of “Responsibility of States for Damage 
done in their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners” to an international conference on 
codification.  See 1 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1930), ix (Shabtai Rosenne ed., 1975). 
 36. The Final Act of the Conference simply reflected that “[t]he Responsibility Committee 
was unable to complete its study of the question of the responsibility of States for damage caused 
on their territory to the person or property of foreigners, and accordingly was unable to make any 
report to the Conference.”  3 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1930), 871 (Shabtai Rosenne ed., 1975). 
 37. Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of the International 
Law Commission, Memorandum by the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 79–84, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/1/Rev.1 (Feb. 10, 1949). 
 38. Id. ¶ 79. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 799 (VIII), U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. 
A/2630, at 52 (Dec. 7, 1953). 
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American but increasingly Asian and African governments also) 
perceived as the law of economic development by capital-exporting 
countries.”41  In particular, one contributor to the ILC debates referred 
to “a distinct cleavage between the views held on the subject of the law 
of claims in the United States of America, on the one hand, and in the 
Latin American republics on the other.”42  It was clear that this was an 
area where deep political and ideological splits would prevent the 
codification of international law, despite the existence of a number of 
cases where arbitral tribunals and courts had applied standards of 
customary international law.  The ILC therefore dropped the plan to 
codify substantive rules of state conduct with regard to aliens, and 
instead turned its attention to identifying the secondary rules of state 
responsibility.43 
It is the same hostility towards the codification of rules on the 
protection of aliens that led many capital-exporting states to conclude 
investment treaties as a means of protecting their nationals investing 
abroad.  The Federal Republic of Germany started this trend in 1959 
when it concluded its first Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with 
Pakistan, and many other states soon followed.44  Today there are over 
2,500 BITs, as well as a growing number of regional economic 
instruments containing a chapter dedicated to the protection of investors 
and investments.45  Most of these instruments contain similar standards 
of investment protection, as well as procedures for investor-state dispute 
settlement that allow individuals or companies negatively affected by 
the actions of a state to bring a claim directly to an arbitral tribunal.46 
 
 41. James Crawford & Tom Grant, Responsibility of States for Injuries to Foreigners, in 
HARVARD RESEARCH IN LAW CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL 77, 89 (John P. Grant 
& J. Craig Barker eds., 2007). 
 42. Comments of Gomez Robledo of the 566th Meeting, [1960] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 265, 
¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1960 (noting three particular areas of disagreement: the position 
of aliens, the waiver of diplomatic protection (Calvo Clause), and the denial of justice). 
 43. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 1–2 (2002). 
 44. The Belgium/Luxembourg Economic Union concluded its first Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (BIT) with Tunisia in 1964.  See F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Protection and 
Promotion of Investments, 52 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L. 241, 241 (1981).  France concluded its first BIT 
in the early 1970s, whereas the United Kingdom started its BIT program in 1975.  See id.  With 
its first BIT concluded with Egypt in 1982, the United States was relatively late in concluding 
investment treaties compared to European nations, although it already had a longstanding 
network of friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties which played a similar role.  See 
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201, 203 (1988). 
 45. WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 7, at 84. 
 46. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 215 (2008). 
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The rapidly growing body of arbitral decisions is leading to what 
some call a global investment regime.47  Yet, there are differences of 
opinion concerning the extent to which BITs converge around common 
standards.  There is a trend for arbitrators to cite other decisions, even 
decisions made under other distinct treaties, on the rationale that “it is a 
fundamental principle of the rule of law that ‘like cases should be 
decided alike,’ unless a strong reason exists to distinguish the current 
case from previous ones.”48  At the same time, clear divergences have 
emerged in the case law about whether common standards exist, and if 
they do, on the content of such standards.49  Indeed, the central question 
that underpins many of the contemporary investment cases is arguably 
the extent to which we can claim the existence of general principles that 
support the multitude of BITs, rather than standards based upon the 
particular intentions of the parties to a treaty.50  This is the context in 
which the ILC has entered the debate about the interpretation and 
application of investment protection standards in BITs. 
IV.  THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION AND MOST-FAVORED-
NATION TREATMENT 
It was in response to the doctrinal confusion at the heart of 
international investment law that the ILC took up the topic of MFN 
treatment in 2009.51  The ILC had already dealt with MFN clauses in 
the 1970s, culminating in the adoption of draft articles on the topic in 
1978.52  Yet, the draft articles had been met with some caution by states, 
 
 47. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. J. INT’L 
L. 427, 431 (2010). 
 48. Daimler Fin. Servs. AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award, ¶ 52 
(Aug. 22, 2012); see also Suez v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on 
Liability, ¶ 189 (July 30, 2010). 
 49. An example would be the conflicting decisions on the scope of the full protection and 
security standard in the U.K.-Argentina BIT.  Compare Suez, supra note 48, ¶ 175, with Nat’l 
Grid P.L.C. v. Argentine Republic, Award, ¶ 189 (UNCITRAL Arb. Nov. 3, 2008).  See also 
Stanimir A. Alexandrov, On the Perceived Inconsistency in Investor-State Jurisprudence, in THE 
EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME: EXPECTATIONS, REALITIES AND OPTIONS 60, 
60–61 (José E. Alvarez & Karl P. Sauvant eds., 2011) (reflecting that some of the perceived 
conflicts can be explained by different facts and different treaty provisions). 
 50. See, e.g., Campbell McLachlan, Investment Treaties and General International Law, 57 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 361, 383 (2008). 
 51. The ILC had first discussed the possibility of adding this topic to the work program in 
2006.  Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, 2006, ¶ 259, 
U.N. Doc. A/61/10; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 Report].  The ILC 
decided to include “the Most-Favoured Nation Clause” on its program of work at the sixtieth 
session and to establish a Study Group at the sixty-first session.  Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 
60th Sess., May 5–June 6, July 7–Aug. 8, 2008, ¶ 354, U.N. Doc. A/63/10; GAOR, 63d Sess., 
Supp. No. 10 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 Report]. 
 52. Draft Articles on Most-Favoured Nation Clauses with Commentaries, [1978] 2 Y.B. 
110 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 45 
and the UN General Assembly did not follow the recommendation of 
the Commission to conclude a treaty on the topic.53  Rather, it 
ultimately decided to simply bring the draft articles to the attention of 
states and relevant intergovernmental organizations for their 
consideration in such cases “as they consider appropriate.”54 
The impetus to revisit the topic came from the increasing relevance of 
MFN to many legal issues, particularly in the field of international 
economic law.  Thus, the ILC noted in its 2008 report that “MFN has 
been given a new lease of life with the inclusion of regional trade 
agreements and the explosion in the conclusion of bilateral investment 
agreements, all usually including some form of MFN requirement.”55  
As a result, “there is now a substantial new body of practice to be taken 
into account in assessing how MFN clauses are being used and how 
they operate in practice.”56 
It seems that the aim of the current work the ILC has undertaken is 
not to revise the draft articles previously adopted in 1978.57  Indeed, the 
Study Group appears to confirm the core principles at the heart of the 
1978 articles in its discussions.58  Rather, “the overall objective of the 
Study Group is to seek to safeguard against fragmentation of 
international law and to stress the importance of greater coherence in 
the approaches taken in the arbitral decisions in the area of investment 
particularly in relation to MFN provisions.”59 
Although the mandate of the Study Group includes MFN in trade law 
and other areas of international law,60 the Study Group has largely 
focused on MFN in the investment context in its work to date.61  The 
 
Int’l L. Comm’n 16, ¶¶ 73–74, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter 1978 
ILC Yearbook]. 
 53. The UN General Assembly adopted five resolutions from 1978 to 1988 calling for 
comments from states on the draft articles.  G.A. Res. 33/139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/33/139 (Dec. 19, 
1978); G.A. Res. 35/161, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/161 (Dec. 15, 1980); G.A. Res. 36/111, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/36/111 (Dec. 10, 1981); G.A. Res. 38/127, U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/127 (Dec. 19, 1978); 
G.A. Res. 40/65, U.N. Doc. A/RES/GAOR, 40th Sess. (Dec. 11, 1985). 
 54. Consideration of the Draft Articles on Most-Favoured Nation Clauses, G.A. Dec. 
46/416, U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/46/655 (Dec. 9, 1991). 
 55. 2008 Report, supra note 51, ¶ 10, Annex B.  See also id. ¶¶ 16–21. 
 56. Id. ¶ 17, Annex B. 
 57. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 63d Sess., Apr. 26–June 3, July 4–Aug. 12, 2011, ¶ 362, 
U.N. Doc. A/66/10; GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 Report]. 
 58. See id. ¶ 355. 
 59. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 64th Sess., May 7–June 1, July 2–Aug. 3, 2012, ¶ 246, 
U.N. Doc. A/67/10; GAOR, 67th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 Report]. 
 60. See id. (noting MFN in relation to trade in services under the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services as well as the relationship between MFN, fair and equitable treatment, and 
national treatment standards “will be kept in view as the Study Group progresses in its work.”). 
 61. Although the Study Group started its discussions with a broad discussion of MFN 
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principal concern underpinning the work of the Study Group is the fact 
that different factors appear to have influenced tribunals in their 
decision-making processes.  In other words, it is the so-called 
“Maffezini problem”62 that has been driving the work of the Study 
Group. 
Maffezini was a case brought by an Argentinean investor against the 
Kingdom of Spain under the Spain-Argentina BIT.63  Spain opposed the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal because the claimant had not complied with 
Article X of the BIT, providing that claimants must submit disputes to 
domestic courts for a period of eighteen months before the claimant 
could launch an international claim.64  In turn, the claimant relied upon 
the MFN clause in the Spain-Argentina BIT to argue that it could claim 
the more favorable treatment granted to Chilean investors who did not 
have to submit their cases to national courts before they started arbitral 
proceedings under the Spain-Chile BIT.65  The tribunal noted that it was 
necessary to interpret the MFN clause in the Spain-Argentina BIT 
subject to the ejusdem generis rule,66 holding as follows: 
[N]otwithstanding the fact that the basic treaty containing the clause 
does not refer expressly to dispute settlement as covered by the most 
favoured nation clause, the Tribunal considers that there are good 
reasons to conclude that today dispute settlement arrangements are 
inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors, as they are 
also related to the protection of rights of traders under treaties of 
commerce.67 
Maffezini was the opening shot in a barrage of lawsuits that sought to 
circumvent or expand the procedural provisions of BITs based upon the 
MFN clause.  Yet the tribunals charged with deciding these disputes 
came to divergent conclusions on whether MFN clauses could be used 
in this way.  Generally, the cases are divided into those that follow the 
general logic and philosophy of Maffezini that dispute settlement 
 
clauses in modern treaty practice, the focus of their deliberations has since narrowed to 
concentrate on the investment context.  At the 2011 session, the Study Group considered a 
working paper prepared by Donald McRae, co-chair of the Study Group, on the “Interpretation 
and Application of MFN Clauses in Investment Agreements.”  See 2011 Report, supra note 57, ¶ 
351.  The following year, the Study Group considered a working paper by Mathias Forteau on the 
“Effect of the Mixed Nature of Investment Tribunals on the Application of MFN Clauses to 
Procedural Provisions” and an updated working paper by Donald McRae on the “Interpretation of 
MFN Clauses by Investment Tribunals.”  See 2012 Report, supra note 59, ¶¶ 250, 264. 
 62. See Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Objections to 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 38–40 (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002). 
 63. See id. ¶ 1. 
 64. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. 
 65. Id. ¶¶ 39–40. 
 66. Id. ¶ 46. 
 67. Id. ¶ 54. 
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provisions do fall within the scope of MFN treatment68 and those cases, 
led by Plama v. Bulgaria,69 that make the opposite assumption.  In 
reality, the picture is much more complex than this simple bifurcation of 
the case law suggests, and tribunals have adopted multiple approaches 
to resolving ambiguities in MFN clauses.  Indeed, the case law on this 
issue has become a veritable quagmire.  Not only have the number of 
cases on this topic continued to grow, but there have also been an 
increasing trend of dissenting opinions being appended to arbitral 
awards, demonstrating the strong differences of opinion on the correct 
interpretation to be given to BITs.70  There is even an example of an 
arbitrator changing his mind about the correct interpretation to be given 
to a particular treaty.71 
Undoubtedly, these cases in part demonstrate different “underlying 
philosoph[ies] of investment arbitration.”72  This is particularly true 
when different tribunals have interpreted the same treaty in 
diametrically opposed ways.73  Differing philosophies, however, is not 
the only explanation for the diversity of results in the MFN cases.  
Many of the differences can also be explained by the fact that the MFN 
clauses in BITs often follow very different formulations.  In this regard, 
the 1978 Draft Articles explicitly recognized that “although it is 
customary to speak of the most-favoured-nation clause, there are many 
forms of the clause, so that any attempt to generalize upon the meaning 
 
 68. E.g., RosInvest v. Russ. Federation, Case No. V/079/2005, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 
124–39 (SCC Arb. 2007). 
 69. Plama Consortium v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 183–227 (Feb. 8, 2005). 
 70. See, e.g., Austrian Airlines v. Slovk. Republic, Final Award, ¶ 1 (UNCITRAL Arb. Oct. 
9, 2009) (Arbitrator Brower, dissenting); Impregillo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/17, Award, ¶¶ 1–3 (June 21, 2011) (Arbitrator Stern, concurring and dissenting, 
Arbitrator Brower, concurring and dissenting); Hochtief AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/31, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 1–2 (Oct. 24, 2011) (Arbitrator Thomas, dissenting); 
Daimler Fin. Servs. AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award, ¶ 1 (Aug. 22, 
2012) (Arbitrator Brower, dissenting). 
 71. See Daimler, supra note 70, ¶ 39, where Arbitrator Janeiro expressed an opinion 
contrary to the opinion he voted for in Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, at 1 (Aug. 3, 2004).  For an explanation of his change of 
heart, see the Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Janeiro where he explains that he “participated in the 
latter decision, including of course the Decision on Jurisdiction, and endorsed the opinion of the 
other members of the tribunal specifically in order to ensure the smooth internal functioning of 
the tribunal.”  Id. 
 72. Yas Banifatemi, The Emerging Jurisprudence on the Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 
in Investment Arbitration, in INVESTMENT TREATY LAW CURRENT ISSUES III 239, 250 (Andrea F. 
Bjorklund, Ian A. Laird & Sergey Ripinsky eds., 2009). 
 73. Compare Siemens, supra note 71, ¶ 184, and Hochtief, supra note 70, ¶ 81 with 
Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award, ¶ 197 
(Dec. 8, 2008) and Daimler, supra note 70, ¶ 200. 
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and effect of such clauses must be made, and accepted, with caution.”74  
Rather, as noted by the Commission of Arbitration in the Ambatielos 
Case, “the question [of the interpretation of an MFN clause] can only be 
determined in accordance with the intention of the Contracting Parties 
as deduced from a reasonable interpretation of the Treaty.”75  Given that 
this is an area where there is a significant diversity of language in 
BITs,76 it follows that there is a limit to the degree of harmonization and 
uniformity that one can expect concerning the interpretation of the MFN 
clause.  In other words, this is an area where assumptions about 
common standards should not be made with too much haste. 
Many investment treaty tribunals have expressly recognized the role 
that treaty language plays in this area.  For example, in Renta 4 v. 
Russian Federation, the tribunal noted the futility of trying to identify 
the dominant view concerning any presumption that must apply to the 
interpretation of a MFN clause.77  The tribunal stressed that “it is a 
matter of the wording of the relevant instruments.”78 
Nevertheless, it is not only treaty language that can make a difference 
in these cases.  In The MOX Plant Case, the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea stressed that “the application of international law 
rules on interpretation of treaties to identical or similar provisions of 
different treaties may not yield the same results, having regard to, inter 
alia, differences in the respective contexts, objects and purposes, 
subsequent practice of parties and travaux préparatoires.”79  The 
application of this logic in the investment context was confirmed by the 
tribunal in AES Corp v. Argentine Republic, when it held that “each BIT 
 
 74. 1978 ILC Yearbook, supra note 52, at 20. 
 75. Ambatielos Claim (Greece/Gr. Brit./N. Ir.), 12 R.I.A.A. 83, 107 (1956). 
 76. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. (UNCTAD), MOST-FAVOURED-NATION 
TREATMENT, at 96, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2010/1, U.N. Sales No. 10.II.D.19 (2010) 
(referring to variations in the approaches to MFN treatment and sometimes considerable 
differences in the wording of the substantive protection or ISDS clauses).  Indeed, as noted by 
Vandevelde, “the MFN treatment provision became common in BITs only in the 1970s [and] the 
structure of the provision was the subject of significant variation in the early history of the 
provision, with some developed countries that were among the first to launch BIT programs 
continuing to modify their provisions significantly even into the 1990s.”  KENNETH J. 
VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY AND INTERPRETATION 
357 (2010). 
 77. Renta 4 S.V.S.A. v. Russ. Federation, Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce, Arbitration V (024/2007), Award on Preliminary Objections, ¶ 94 (Mar. 20, 2009). 
 78. Id. ¶ 90.  The tribunal continued, “this is one of the reasons awards under BITs are of 
variable relevance and value in subsequent cases.”  Id.  The tribunal in Maffezini itself noted that 
the MFN clause that it was faced with interpreting, which applied to “all matters subject to this 
Agreement,” was broader than the usual formulation found in many other investment treaties 
concluded by Spain.  Maffezini, supra note 62, ¶ 60. 
 79. MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Order of Dec. 3, 2001, 10 ITLOS Rep. 95, ¶ 
51. 
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has its own identity; its very terms should consequently be carefully 
analyzed for determining the exact scope of consent expressed by its 
two Parties.”80  The tribunal continued that, “striking similarities in the 
wording of many BITs often dissimulate real differences in the 
definition of some key concepts, as it may be the case, in particular, for 
the determination of ‘investments’ or for the precise definition of rights 
and obligations for each party.”81  Indeed, the recent decision in 
Austrian Airlines v. Slovak Republic emphasized the importance of 
context in interpreting MFN clauses.82 
This observation on the bilateral nature of MFN clauses has 
important implications for the nature of any work undertaken by the 
ILC on this topic.  The ILC Study Group has recognized the diversity of 
language and the need to take into account the particular intentions of 
the parties to a treaty.  The 2012 Report of the ILC stated that “whether 
or not an MFN provision was capable of applying to the dispute 
settlement provisions was a matter of treaty interpretation to be 
answered depending on each particular treaty, which had its own 
specificities to be taken into account.”83  Yet, if the meaning of each 
treaty potentially differs, what general guidance can the ILC usefully 
proffer? 
One possible approach that could be taken by the ILC is to focus on 
the methods of interpretation adopted by arbitral tribunals when 
analyzing MFN clauses.  This has been the focus of several working 
papers discussed by the Study Group to date.84  On this basis, the ILC 
may be able to assist in preparing interpretative guidance on the 
underlying principles that may inform the interpretation of MFN 
clauses.85  It must be wondered, however, whether the ILC can do 
anything more than recommend that tribunals follow more carefully the 
general rules on treaty interpretation found in Articles 31–33 of the 
Vienna Convention. 
An alternative output suggested by the Study Group is the 
development of “model MFN clauses or categories of clauses with 
 
 80. AES Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 24 (Apr. 26, 2005). 
 81. Id. ¶ 25. 
 82. Austrian Airlines, supra note 70, ¶ 138.  Note, however, the strong dissenting opinion of 
Arbitrator Brower on this point, where he says that “it is not appropriate to consider provisions as 
‘context’ for interpreting an MFN clause that are less favourable than provisions in third-State 
treaties to which Claimant claims access.”  Id. ¶ 7 (Brower, Arb., dissenting). 
 83. 2012 Report, supra note 59, ¶ 262. 
 84. See, e.g., 2012 Report, supra note 59, ¶¶ 258–59. 
 85. Id. ¶ 260. 
2013] The International Law Commission 115 
commentaries on their interpretation.”86  Such clauses would be directed 
as “guidance to States in their negotiation of agreements with MFN 
clauses.”87  This approach certainly avoids the need to address the 
differences in existing treaty language by focusing on possible advice 
for negotiators of future instruments.  Yet, the merits of this approach 
are also questionable.  Even if model clauses are accepted as helpful in 
avoiding the problems posed in the case law, it must be wondered 
whether the ILC is the best body to conduct this type of work. 
Other parties have undertaken similar exercises in the past.  The UN 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has already 
explicitly provided policy advice to negotiators and policy-makers.88  
Particularly notable in this context is the UNCTAD report on MFN 
Treatment, updated in 2010, which precisely aims to provide policy 
advice and guidance to states seeking to negotiate investment treaties.89  
The report generally advises states to “be aware that, as for any other 
provision of the investment treaty, wording matters and the formulation 
resulting from the negotiation should make the intention of the parties 
clear and unambiguous,”90 as well as setting forth model language that 
can be used by negotiators to achieve this end.  Any effort by the ILC to 
develop model clauses would therefore appear to be duplicating activity 
that is taking place in other forums. 
Indeed, there is evidence that states are already beginning to address 
these issues, even without the advice of international institutions.  
Looking at recently concluded investment treaties, it would appear that 
states have recognized that they may have to give a more precise 
indication of their intentions.  Thus, for example, the 2009 U.K.-
Ethiopia BIT expressly provides in its MFN clause that “except 
provided otherwise in this Agreement and for the avoidance of doubt it 
is confirmed that the treatment provided for in paragraphs (1) and (2) 
above shall apply to the provisions of Articles 1 to 10 of this 
Agreement,” thus making clear that it covers investor-state dispute 
settlement.91  In contrast, Article 88(2) of the Japan-Switzerland 
Economic Partnership Agreement provides that “[i]t is understood that 
 
 86. 2008 Report, supra note 51, ¶ 38, Annex B. 
 87. Id. 
 88. MOST-FAVOURED-NATION TREATMENT, supra note 76, 102–16. 
 89. Thus, the report provides, “it is . . . important to take stock of the way treaty practice has 
evolved and to what extent States have reacted to the debate on MFN treatment [in order to] allow 
States [to make] better-informed decisions for drafting and negotiating purposes . . . .”  Id. at 4. 
 90. Id. at 87. 
 91. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Eth., art. 3(3), Nov. 
19, 2009, available at 
http://arbitration.org/sites/default/files/bit/ethiopia_united_kingdom_english.pdf.  
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the treatment referred to in paragraph 1 does not include treatment 
accorded to investors of a non-Party and their investments by provisions 
concerning the settlement of investment disputes between a Party and 
the non-Party that are provided for in other international agreements.”92  
In addition to these examples of language found in the treaties 
themselves, some states have resorted to authoritative interpretations to 
clarify their intentions.93  For example, it is reported that “the Argentine 
Republic and Panama exchanged diplomatic notes with an 
‘interpretative declaration’ of the MFN clause in their 1996 investment 
treaty to the effect that, the MFN clause does not extend to dispute 
resolution clauses, and that this has always been their intention.”94  
Ironically, such moves have the effect of creating further diversity and 
fragmentation by focusing on the specific intention of the parties, rather 
than general principles. 
The conclusion that can be gleaned from this analysis is that the ILC 
can only make a limited contribution to the MFN question, given the 
fundamentally bilateral nature of the issue.  Indeed, this is a point that 
has been made in relation to other topics on the agenda of the 
Commission.  For example, when it was proposed to consider the topic 
of oil and gas law under the rubric of shared natural resources, the ILC 
decided that the fact that “transboundary oil and gas issues were 
essentially bilateral in nature” raised doubts about “the need for the 
Commission to proceed with any codification exercise on the issue, 
including the development of universal rules.”95  Rather, “it was 
considered that the option of collecting and analysing information about 
State practice concerning transboundary oil and gas . . . would not lead 
to a fruitful exercise for the Commission, precisely because of the 
specificities of each case involving oil and gas.”96  While this is a crude 
analogy, it can also be said that the interpretation of MFN clauses varies 
on a case-by-case basis depending on the intentions of the parties to a 
 
 92. For a broader range of examples in United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, see MOST-FAVOURED-NATION TREATMENT, supra note 76, 84–87. 
 93. It is generally accepted under the law of treaties that parties are capable of adopting 
interpretative agreements which must be taken into account in the interpretative process.  See 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 26, art. 31(3)(a).  See also Anthea Roberts, 
Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 179, 179 (2010). 
 94. Nat’l Grid P.L.C. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 85 (UNCITRAL 
Arb. June 20, 2006).  
 95. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 62d Sess., May 3–June 4, July 5–Aug. 6, 2010, ¶ 382, 
U.N. Doc. A/65/10; GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2010).  Other reasons were also advanced 
for not considering the topic, including the fact that the subject may touch upon continental shelf 
delimitation, which was a politically delicate subject.  Id. 
 96. Id. ¶ 383. 
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particular treaty.  In other words, the specificities of the issue suggest 
that further study of MFN treatment may not be a fruitful exercise for 
the ILC and will yield limited results. 
At the same time, it does not follow that the ILC has no role to play 
in the development of international investment law.  The following Part 
argues that the ILC could play a potentially significant role in 
identifying universal rules that underpin and unite the plethora of BITs 
in the international investment law universe. 
V.  THE SEARCH FOR UNIVERSAL INVESTMENT RULES 
The previous Part argued that it cannot be assumed that similarly 
worded treaties should be interpreted in the same way.  There are often 
strong legal and practical reasons why tribunals should acknowledge 
and apply differences in wording.  At the same time, many authors also 
agree that there may be circumstances in which tribunals should 
interpret different treaties according to a single, common rule.  Thus, 
S.W. Schill argues that “[n]otwithstanding . . . differences, investment 
treaties conform to archetypes and converge considerably with regard to 
the principles of investment protection that they establish.”97  He 
continues, “[t]hese principles are more or less identical across the 
myriad of BITs [and] divergences in the treaty texts are arguably limited 
enough so as to allow the conclusion that one can observe the existence 
of relatively uniform treaty texts that form the basis of any international 
investment treaty.”98  Similarly, K.J. Vandevelde asserts the following: 
Given that the language of the provision often is somewhat vague 
and general in any event, little reason exists to believe in most cases 
that minor changes in languages were meant to alter significantly the 
meaning of the provision.  Such changes often reflected little more 
than stylistic preferences or perhaps attempts to state more clearly 
that which was presumed to be the meaning of the provision.99 
 Such arguments must be treated with caution, as they make 
assumptions about universality that may not be justified.  Moreover, 
they overlook the autonomy of states when concluding investment 
treaties.  This is why arguments about coherence in relation to the 
interpretation of MFN clauses appear misplaced. 
Nevertheless, the argument for universal rules can be justified if it 
draws upon other sources of international law apart from the treaty 
itself.  In his more recent work on multilateralism in investment law, 
Schill acknowledged that “the move . . . to create a multilateral order for 
 
 97. SCHILL, supra note 2, at 65. 
 98. Id. at 69. 
 99. VANDEVELDE, supra note 76, at 13. 
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international investment relations will only be legitimate and accepted 
by States if it remains linked to one of the traditional sources of 
multilateral order under international law.”100  This is an important 
clarification because it recognizes that there must be a doctrinal 
foundation for drawing links between what are otherwise distinct 
instruments.  It follows that there is a need to identify whether there is a 
basis for a common standard in another source of international law 
before one can talk about a universal rule or principle that applies to all 
states.  This basic consideration must inform the debates about the 
emergence of a jurisprudence constante in international investment law.  
It can also help assess the potential role that the ILC can play in the 
development of international investment law. 
Although both customary international law and general principles 
could provide a source for a unifying force in international investment 
law,101 the focus of this Article is on the former for two principal 
reasons.  The first reason for prioritizing the search for rules of 
customary international law is that general principles are generally 
considered to play a secondary role in international law, in the sense 
that they should only be applied where there is a lack of treaty law or 
customary law.102  Thus, the first inquiry is whether there is a customary 
rule; only if there is no evidence of such a rule would there be a second 
inquiry into whether there is a general principle that can be deduced 
from national legal systems.  The second reason is that tribunals most 
commonly make reference to customary international law as the source 
providing a relevant inspiration for the interpretation and application of 
BITs.103  In this context, there are two principal ways in which 
 
 100. See Stephan W. Schill, From Sources to Discourse: Investment Treaty Jurisprudence as 
the New Custom?, BRIT. INST. INT’L & COMP. L., 
http://www.biicl.org/files/5630_stephan_schill.pdf. 
 101. Some authors argue for a greater role for general principles of law.  See, e.g., Stephan 
W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and 
Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 25 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 60 (2011).  
Tribunals have also recognized the potential role of general principles identified through a 
comparative analysis.  Thus, one tribunal noted that “[t]he fair and equitable treatment standard of 
international law does not depend on the perception of the frustrated investor, but should use 
public international law and comparative domestic public law as a benchmark.”  Toto Costruzioni 
Generali S.p.A. v. Republic of Leb., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award, ¶ 166 (June 7, 2012). 
 102. See, e.g., Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
114 (M.D. Evans ed., 2010) (“[S]ince . . . it was the intention of the draftsmen of the [Permanent 
Court of International Justice] Statute that the ‘general principles of law’ should provide a fall-
back source of law in the event that no treaty and no customary rule could be found to apply to a 
given situation, it is clear that to this extent there exists a hierarchy of sources.  If a treaty rule or a 
customary rule exists, then there is no possibility of appealing to general principles of law to 
exclude or modify it.”). 
 103. Tarcisio Gazzini, The Role of Customary International Law in the Field of Foreign 
Investment Law, 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 691, 691 (2007) (“[C]ustomary rules 
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customary international law interacts with investment treaties. 
Firstly, there are many provisions in investment treaties that 
explicitly refer to rules of customary international law.  Indeed, the 
inclusion of such provisions would appear to be increasing.  For 
example, the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement provides that: “[e]ach 
Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with 
customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and 
full protection and security.”104  It continues as follows: 
For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the 
minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered 
investments.  The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and 
“full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to 
or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create 
additional substantive rights.105 
It is not only in relation to the minimum standard of treatment that 
customary international law has been expressly relied upon.  Annex 10-
C of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) provides that its rule on expropriation 
in Article 10.7.1 “is intended to reflect customary international law 
concerning the obligation of States with respect to expropriation.”106  
The CAFTA-DR also makes a reference to customary international law 
in Article 10.6(2) which requires restitution or compensation “in 
accordance with customary international law” where the property of an 
investor has been requisitioned or unnecessarily destroyed by the armed 
forces of a party during armed conflict or times of strife.107  These 
examples demonstrate that states have customary international law in 
mind when they draft their investment treaties, and they often expressly 
refer to this source in specific treaty provisions. 
Secondly, even in the absence of an express reference, customary 
international law may also be relevant to the interpretation and 
application of a treaty on the basis of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention.  The Convention requires a treaty interpreter to “take into 
 
constantly and intensely interact with bilateral and multilateral rules.”); José E. Alvarez, A BIT on 
Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 17, 31 (2009) (“There are many other provisions in 
[investment] treaties that explicitly or implicitly rely on general international law or reflect an 
intent by their drafters to affirm traditional principles of state responsibility to aliens.”). 
 104. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Kor., Mar. 15, 2012, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text [hereinafter Korea-U.S. FTA]. 
 105. Id. art. 11.6. 
 106. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, Annex 10-
C, Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CAFTA/CAFTADR_e/CAFTADRin_e.asp 
[hereinafter CAFTA-DR]. 
 107. Id. art. 10.6(2). 
120 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 45 
account . . . relevant applicable rules of international law.”108  Given 
that customary international law is by its very nature applicable to all 
states,109 there is little doubt that these rules provide part of the wider 
context of an investment treaty for the purpose of the Vienna 
Convention.110 
VI.  TOWARDS THE CODIFICATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW? 
If it is accepted that customary international law can play a role in 
providing common standards that underpin investment treaties, the task 
of identifying customary international law for the protection of foreign 
investment is not straightforward.  It is well known that customary 
international law requires evidence of general practice accepted as 
law.111  On this basis, it is often said that custom is made up of two 
components—state practice and opinio juris.  Yet, it is a mistake to 
consider these as two separate components, as they are intrinsically 
linked.  Opinio juris can be considered as a way of explaining the 
emergence of particular state practice.  To this end, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) has stressed that “not only must the acts 
concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be 
carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice 
is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of [customary] law 
requiring it.”112  There is clear evidence that states still support this 
understanding of customary international law in the field of investment 
protection.  For example, several investment treaties concluded by the 
United States with other states explicitly confirm that customary 
international law “results from a general and consistent practice of 
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States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation.”113 
Evidence of state practice and opinio juris can be collected from a 
number of sources, including “administrative acts, legislation, decisions 
of courts and activities on the international stage.”114  Similarly, the 
tribunal in Glamis Gold mentioned the following material sources of 
custom: “treaty ratification language, statements of governments, treaty 
practice (e.g., Model BITs), and sometimes pleadings.”115 
Nevertheless, proving the existence of customary international law is 
often a difficult task, particularly in the context of litigation that 
necessarily involves a limited number of states.  Moreover, in the case 
of an alleged general rule of customary international law, the focus of 
the exercise is not on what the parties to the treaty think is custom.  
Rather, it is necessary to look more broadly for evidence of “extensive 
and virtually uniform” practice that is representative of the international 
community as a whole.116  In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ noted the 
following: 
The Court notes that there is in fact evidence . . . of a considerable 
degree of agreement between the Parties as to the content of the 
customary international law relating to the non-use of force and non-
intervention.  This concurrence of their views does not however 
dispense the Court from having itself to ascertain what rules of 
customary international law are applicable.  The mere fact that States 
declare their recognition of certain rules is not sufficient for the 
Court to consider these as being part of customary international law, 
and as applicable as such to those States.  Bound as it is by Article 
38 of its Statute to apply, inter alia, international custom “as 
evidence of general practice accepted as law,” the Court may not 
disregard the essential role played by general practice.117 
Yet, there has often been reluctance on the part of courts and 
tribunals to enter into an explicit analysis of state practice and opinio 
juris in their identification of customary international law.118  Thus, one 
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commentator noted that the ICJ has often made decisions about the 
existence of customary international law “without embarking upon any 
empirical research as to whether the respective rules were recognized as 
law and reflected in State practice.”119  Similarly, a general assessment 
of state practice and opinio juris is often missing from decisions of 
investment tribunals.  Surveying decisions rendered by International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes tribunals between January 
1, 1998, and December 31, 2006, O.K. Fauchald concludes that “no 
tribunal made its own assessment of whether a rule of customary 
international law existed, and only exceptionally did tribunals explicitly 
address questions concerning opinio juris.”120 
One cannot necessarily place all of the blame on tribunals for this 
lacuna.  Proving the existence of custom is essentially a question of 
fact,121 and the burden of proof lies upon the party claiming the 
existence of a customary rule.122  The decisions of courts and tribunals 
are therefore largely a response to the evidence that parties have placed 
before them.  Yet, is it truly reasonable to expect litigants to 
comprehensively collect and present evidence of state practice and 
opinio juris? 
The challenge of determining the existence of customary 
international law is made even more difficult by that fact that custom is 
by its very nature evolutionary, so that it changes in accordance with 
trends of state practice and opinio juris.  Indeed, the tribunal in Glamis 
Gold noted that “although an examination of custom is indeed necessary 
to determine the scope and bounds of current customary international 
law, this requirement . . . because of the difficulty in proving a change 
in custom, effectively freezes the protections provided for in this 
provision . . . .”123  What this statement of the tribunal reveals is that 
courts and tribunals do not consider that their role is to establish the 
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definitive state of customary international law at the time of the claim, 
but rather to determine whether the litigants have presented convincing 
evidence for the claims they are making.  This leaves basic questions 
about the state of customary international law unanswered. 
It is precisely in this area of weakness for arbitral tribunals that other 
bodies may step in to contribute to the development of international 
investment law.  As noted above, the codification of customary 
international law is one of the core tasks of the ILC.124  Unlike tribunals 
that must rely upon evidence produced by the parties in litigation, the 
procedures followed by the ILC mean that it has the time and ability to 
gather a broad range of evidence of state practice and opinio juris before 
reaching conclusions on the status of customary international law.  
Moreover, states’ interactions with the ILC, as described above, help it 
in this task.  Indeed, the advantage of the Commission taking on the task 
of codification, as opposed to private bodies or other intergovernmental 
institutions, is its central place within the UN system and its relationship 
with states.  This interaction allows the ILC to request information 
directly from all states, and it also permits states to comment on the 
proposals of the ILC as they are made. 
Even for a body such as the ILC, the task of codifying customary 
international investment law is not necessarily straightforward.  There 
are certain features of this area of law that pose specific challenges for 
the process of codification.  In particular, the proliferation of investment 
treaties raises problems.  In this regard, C. McLachlan comments that 
“the overwhelming majority of State practice in this field in the last few 
decades has been through the medium of treaty-making, starving 
custom of independent progressive development.”125  Thus, he 
concludes that “an application of the classic test for the formation of a 
rule of custom in this area would have little meaning, given the paucity 
of any State practice outside the treaties’ reach.”126  While it is true that 
there are many investment treaties, does it necessarily follow that there 
is a lack of state practice and opinio juris?  Several comments can be 
made in this regard. 
In the first place, some authors would argue that the thousands of 
BITs have themselves contributed to the development of customary 
international law, muddying the waters between treaty and custom.127  
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This argument appears to have received a positive reception in Mondev 
v. United States, where the tribunal noted that “such a body of 
concordant practice will necessarily have influenced the content of rules 
governing the treatment of foreign investment in current international 
law.”128  Of course, it begs the question whether this practice is 
accompanied by the requisite opinio juris.129  Regardless of the answer 
to this question, there is clearly a serious issue that needs addressing and 
the ILC could play a valuable role in this process.  One of the key 
challenges for codification in this area is to disentangle treaty law from 
customary international law in order to know when one can talk about 
universal rules and principles and when one should concentrate on 
identifying the intentions of the particular parties to a treaty. 
Secondly, as noted above, several treaties expressly refer to 
customary international law and therefore practice in relation to those 
provisions will necessarily relate to the formulation of customary 
rules.130  For example, states have expressly considered the content of 
customary international law in their pleadings in relation to the 
interpretation of Article 1105 of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and tribunals have sometimes considered this evidence.131  
Of course, pleadings will only represent the views of the states involved 
in litigation, and it would also be necessary to look for other evidence of 
state practice and opinio juris in order to prove the existence of a 
general rule of customary international law.  Nevertheless, it 
demonstrates that there are still opportunities for states to express views 
on the content of customary international law, distinct from treaty rules. 
Thirdly, despite the proliferation of investment treaties, there are still 
many inter-state relationships that treaties do not govern.132  Indeed, the 
importance of a codification exercise is that it gathers and evaluates all 
potential evidence of state practice and opinio juris before it comes to 
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conclusions about the existence of certain rules of customary 
international law. 
It follows, and this Article argues, that the existence of more than 
2,500 BITs would not necessarily prevent the ILC from gathering 
sufficient evidence of state practice and opinio juris to codify customary 
international law.  Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that it is also 
possible that the process of formulating and discussing rules on 
investment protection could lead to the crystallization of customary 
rules that did not previously exist, provided that they find support of 
sufficient states.133 
Regardless of the availability of sources, there are critics who believe 
that trying to identify substantive rules of customary international law in 
the field of investment protection is a fool’s errand.  For example, J. 
D’Aspremont argues that many of the standards that are commonly 
claimed to have crystallized into customary international law are 
“highly imprecise and vague,”134 and he highlights the international 
minimum standard of treatment as a prime example.135  If true, this 
critique arguably holds true of many rules found in investment treaties 
as well.  Moreover, it ignores the view that states clearly accept that 
such rules do exist as a matter of customary international law.  Yet, 
what this critique does usefully highlight is that this Article’s approach 
need not seek specific rules of conduct that guide states in particular 
situations, but rather general principles which provide an international 
benchmark for state behavior in relation to foreign investors.136 
VII.  PLACING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW ON THE 
AGENDA OF THE ILC 
There are several aspects of international investment law for which 
clarification and elucidation of customary international law could be 
helpful, including rules and principles relating to expropriation, fair and 
equitable treatment, denial of justice, and constant protection and 
security.  In many instances, these are standards that investment treaty 
tribunals are already trying to interpret according to a multilateral 
logic—an exercise that would itself benefit from a firmer basis in actual 
evidence of state practice and opinio juris. 
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All of these issues also arguably meet the ILC’s own criteria for the 
selection of topics, notably that: 
[T]he topic should reflect the needs of the States in respect of the 
progressive development and codification of customary international 
law; the topic should be sufficiently advanced in stage in terms of 
State practice to permit progressive development and codification; 
that the topic is concrete and feasible for progressive development 
and codification.137 
In particular, given the fact that tribunals are increasingly faced with 
having to identify and apply rules of customary international law in 
relation to the protection of foreign investors, there would appear to be 
an urgent need for action on this point.  Moreover, despite many 
statements about the evolution of customary international law, 
particularly in relation to the minimum standard of treatment,138 there 
has been little substantive and comprehensive analysis of state practice 
and opinio juris in this area. 
It would appear that the ILC has already recognized the significance of 
at least one of these issues.  In 2011, the ILC inscribed the subject of 
“fair and equitable treatment” onto its long-term work plan.139  The vast 
majority of BITs make reference to fair and equitable treatment, and it 
is perhaps “the most frequently pleaded obligation in international 
investment arbitration.”140  There is, of course, intense controversy 
about the precise meaning of this term.  The concept paper prepared for 
the ILC identifies a number of questions relating to the standard, 
including: (1) whether fair and equitable treatment is synonymous with 
the international minimum standard, (2) whether the fair and equitable 
treatment standard now represents customary international law, and (3) 
whether fair and equitable treatment is a principle of international 
law.141 
It is apparent that the concept paper raises a wide range of questions 
concerning fair and equitable treatment, including both treaty law and 
customary law aspects of the problem.  It is suggested that, in light of 
the foregoing arguments, the questions relating to customary 
international law would be particularly suitable for study by the ILC.  It 
is in this respect that the Commission can draw on its strengths and it 
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can make the greatest contribution to promoting coherence in the 
development of international investment law by giving a more precise 
formulation and legal basis for the application of the minimum 
standards of treatment under customary international law. 
It could of course be objected that the ILC has tried to undertake this 
task before, but it was defeated by political deadlock.  Yet, it is 
questionable whether such controversy continues to exist today.  If 
anything, the conclusion of more than 2,500 investment treaties by 
states across the world suggests that the sensitivity towards the 
treatment of aliens under international law has diminished.142  Such 
treaties are not only concluded between developed countries and 
developing countries, but also between developing countries, 
demonstrating the general acceptability of investment rules in the 
twenty-first century.  The ILC could make a substantial contribution to 
this question by identifying relevant state practice and opinio juris.  Not 
only can it assist tribunals in identifying relevant material evidence of 
customary international law, but the ILC can also suggest, in 
accordance with the understanding of codification discussed above,143 
how to fill gaps in a manner that may contribute to the development of 
law in this area. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
International investment law is already on the agenda of the ILC and 
it looks likely to stay there as the topic continues to enjoy a central 
position in the development of international law.  This raises questions 
about precisely which aspects of the subject the ILC should consider.  
This Article argues that there is a considerable difference between those 
standards of investment law that are based solely on treaty law and 
those standards that owe some of their existence to broader rules and 
principles of customary international law or general principles.  To date, 
the ILC has concentrated its efforts on demystifying the MFN clause, 
which belongs in the former category.  Yet, the diversity of language of 
MFN clauses and the fact that such provisions rest solely upon a treaty 
basis means that it is difficult to draw generalizable conclusions in this 
area.  Moreover, there is already a growing body of scholarly analysis 
and policy advice so that any future recommendations of the ILC are in 
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danger of being lost in the crowd.  Similar observations could be made 
about other controversial treaty standards in investment jurisprudence, 
such as umbrella clauses or procedural conditions attached to dispute 
settlement. 
In contrast, the controversies and uncertainties surrounding the 
current status of customary rules for the protection of foreign 
investment would seem to be an area in which the ILC, embedded as it 
is within the intergovernmental structures of the UN, would be in a 
prime, if not unique, position to address.  The continuing importance of 
customary international law to the protection of foreign investment, 
particularly when it is expressly incorporated into treaties, means that 
this is an area where the ILC could make a real difference by drawing 
upon its expertise in codification.  If successful, the results of the 
codification process are likely to be highly persuasive, and they will 
give more legitimacy to centralizing trends evident in the decisions of 
investment tribunals.  Thus, where there are standards of investment 
protection found in customary international law, the elaboration of draft 
articles by the ILC, in close consultation with the international 
community of states, could help to provide a firm foundation for the 
coherent development of these aspects of international investment law.  
It follows that the enterprise of codifying rules of customary 
international law would appear to offer the ILC a valuable opportunity 
to achieve its stated aim of “safeguard[ing] against fragmentation of 
international law and stress[ing] the importance of greater coherence in 
the approaches taken in the arbitral decisions in the area of 
investment.”144 
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